BL
181
E57
1836
GTU Rare

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA

NATURAL THEOLOGY:

THE ARGUMENTS

OF

PALEY, BROUGHAM,

AND

THE BRIDGEWATER TREATISES

ON THIS SUBJECT EXAMINED:

ALSO

THE DOCTRINES OF

BROUGHAM AND THE IMMATERIALISTS

RESPECTING THE SOUL.

By GEORGE ENSOR, Esq.

This Tract was printed for the Author's friends, but may be reprinted by any one.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY RICHARD TAYLOR, RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET.

1836.

GRADUATE THEOLOGICAL UNION LIBRARY 1962

Property of CBSK

Please return to Graduate Theological Union Library

BL
181
E57
1836

9510
705



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026 with funding from
Graduate Theological Union

#39934649

https://archive.org/details/naturaltheologya00enso_0

B154
Ex 79

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

THE ARGUMENTS OF PALEY, BROUGHAM, AND THE BRIDGEWATER TREATISES, EXAMINED.

WRITERS on Theology are almost infinite, and they began with the dawn of letters. Poets, philosophers, and orators have contributed their various powers to the discussion. Orpheus led the way among those inspired by the Muses; and amidst Grecian sages, Aristotle in his Metaphysics noticed the subject, and divided it into the natural and civil: the latter he esteemed fabulous and intended to deceive. Cicero wrote an entire treatise *de Natura Deorum*. The schoolmen of course composed folio volumes on the same subject, each longer than the novels of Scuderi: this was the age of interminable debates on vermiculate questions of suppositions without facts, and arguments without a trace of reasoning. In after times Leibnitz wrote on metaphysical theology, and many Germans before and after have dis-

23576

cussed the same topic, mistaking an abuse of language for new and improved views on that question. We have had in England also a large contribution in the same class, Physico-Theology, Astro-Theology, &c.; and lastly, Lord Brougham (a man unequalled for the diversity of his knowledge, his power and facility in writing and speaking, and, perhaps, still more distinguished for his unwearied zeal in advancing education in all departments of knowledge,) has added to the increasing host a Discourse on Natural Theology. He states that his objects in this treatise are "to explain the nature of the evidence upon which natural theology rests, and to show that it is a science, the truths of which are discovered by induction like the truths of natural or moral philosophy." (p. 7, 2nd edition, always used.) The subject is therefore necessarily relieved from the limits of faith or of belief as contradistinguished from reason, and of course detached from all peculiarities connected with particular religions. To admit faith in this discussion would evidently be to mistake the object and the means of debate, and offend against Bacon's repeated warning, "to give faith nothing that is not faith's." (Works, vol. ii. p. 363, Shaw's edition, always used.) I may add, that as the subject is not properly religious but philosophical, it should not excite any very angry passions among sectarians or religionists; yet still I more than fear that some, from weakness, or ignorance, or hypocrisy, will be of-

fended if Lord Brougham's and his predecessors' views be controverted, their facts tested, and their logic arraigned; for it is not uncommon with parties to confound the manner of treating a topic with the matter itself: hence the subject being approved by them, the defence for it receives a kind reception, and even when most faulty it is approached with reserve if not with respect, while the contravening critic is denounced as unadvised, hostile, if not insidious, criminal, or prompting, as they suggest, under the veil of romantic truth, the reader to listen to ruinous conclusions. Yet it is certain that philosophy should be discussed philosophically, and that truth never can be injured by truth, though it is frequently tainted and paralysed by falsehood and hypocrisy.

Lord Brougham says it was intended that the "Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge should publish an edition of Paley's Essay on Natural Theology, but that the project was abandoned lest it might introduce a religious controversy among the members of the Society." Whether he was in the minority on this occasion does not appear, yet hence the publication of his present essay, and, no doubt, what is unsuited for an aggregate of persons may not be unfitting for an individual. But why Paley's work should be chosen as the text for a society or by an individual in the present state of positive knowledge and advanced opinions has not been explained. Yet such is the fact, and further, this essay is but a preface

to an enlarged republication of Paley's Theology by Lord Brougham, with the cooperation of Sir Charles Bell, in which Lord Brougham says they have made considerable progress. We may also go higher and ask whence the necessity at all of the discussion? Is theology attacked? is the Deity denied? Long since Bacon said, "In this part of Natural Theology we find rather an excess than a defect." (vol. i. p. 72.) Yet since he wrote, a thousand volumes on this topic, in all its bearings, have been composed; and even while Lord Brougham was writing singly and in partnership, a bequest of 8000*l.* enlisted as many authors as thousands in the legacy, who have pressed all subjects in aid of the same purpose, from "the human hand" to "the function of digestion." Yet Lord Brougham, whatever he may hereafter effect, has published no novelty in respect to Natural Theology. The beginning, midst, and end of all his arguments rest on Final Causes; a process of reasoning which was repudiated by the great apostle of modern philosophy. The fact is notorious. Lord Brougham remarks, rather reprovingly, that *Lord Bacon has not indulged in any speculation akin to Natural Theology*, and that in his Sylva Sylvarum "he has not made any allusion to final causes," (p. 147). He further says, "there is hardly any writer upon moral or natural science in whose works fewer references can be found to the power or wisdom of a superintending Providence." Lord Brougham is anxious,

however, to weaken this discredit to his argument, and to infer that if Lord Bacon was not a friend he at worst was but a questionable opponent to the philosophical application of final causes, and he industriously collects some casualties of expression which he urges as a qualified approbation of them. Well; as Homer nodded, according to Horace, why might not Bacon *nictitate*? And there is another nodding when a philosophical writer vails to established error; as the learned Jesuits, who, when they published Newton's Philosophy, prefaced the work by condemning its contents, for the orthodox reason that the Pontificate had decreed that the earth did not move. I do not say that Bacon admitted, with a saving faith, a final cause to conciliate the Protestant pontiffs, great and small; but as an example of his very few seeming backslidings in many disquisitions I subjoin the following: "These final causes, however, are not false or unworthy of inquiry in metaphysics, but their excursion into the limits of *physical causes* hath made a great devastation in that province; otherwise, when contained within their own bounds, they are not repugnant to physical causes; for the cause that the hairs of the eyelids are to preserve the sight is no way contradictory to this, that pilosity is incident to the orifices of moisture, and so of the rest. These two kinds of causes agreeing excellently together, the one expressing the intention, the other the consequence only." So much saith Bacon for final causes; and if this

be an authority, let their professed advocates proclaim their ally. But there are various pilosities on the human body,—what are their final causes? Could they be brought within the same scheme of reference even if man's body was studded with eyes like Argus? And how are these pilosities treated by mankind? Long hair and short hair, in my experience, have had their turn; in an age preceding wigs were honoured; and even at this day the bench and bar are wigged in respect to Conservative precedents common to a period of bygone gentility, and learned serjeants have their wigs tonsured, a device lay and clerical, and in sheer opposition to the Chinese in office, who nourish a central tuft. Then the beard: what would the Jupiters, or the Jews, who were ordered not to mar the corners of their beards, or the Turks be without beards sweeping their bosoms? In this Christians also concurred, for Dudley North observes, that at Archangel "the men count it a sin to have either long hair or a short beard." In other countries this is reversed; in England who has not heard of love-locks denounced episcopally, and in Ireland of the glibbes made penal by the law of Henry the Eighth? The ancient Britons were content with moustaches like the more terrible military man; while the modern fashionables nourish an undergrowth about the nether joles which involves the face, as the acanthus is said to have changed a block of stone into a Corinthian capital. Then, whole nations consider hair a

beastly excrescence, to be rubbed off as it appears, and eradicated at once and for ever.

Final causes cannot be brought within the pale of Bacon's philosophy, nor can they even enjoy a toleration, though Lord Brougham is anxious to qualify his mighty predecessor's peremptory rejection of them. Bacon, if his own actual discoveries were limited, revealed the earthly and heavenly ways of discovery; his views were simple, his purpose universal. He declared for facts deduced from exact observation, and he taught, according to the homely phrase of his scholar Locke, to "stop when you are at the end of your tether;" he did not transgress the limits he prescribed to others. Yet no one from his fancy and imagination, and the untutored æra in which he flourished, was more likely to luxuriate, not occasionally, but to run riot in language and speculation, for with overpowering genius he cropped the flowers of all literature, and made the arts and sciences the zodiac of his intellectual course. However so qualified and adorned, he was a rigid dialectician; he would not depose philosophy nor enshrine it with conceit, though thus he was sure of winning the low popularity which follows the glorification of final causes. On the contrary, he compared them with peculiar felicity to a virgin dedicated to God, and sterile in her generation, an expression which might of itself be conclusive of Bacon's judgement on the point; but similar remarks more than once occur in the *Novum Or-*

ganum: he says, vol. ii. p. 354, "But the impotence of the mind proves more pernicious in the discovery of causes: for although the highest universal in nature ought to be positive things, because they are found and cannot be made, yet the understanding, not knowing how to stop, is still desirous of higher satisfaction, and endeavouring to stretch further light upon *final causes*, which are plainly of the nature of man rather than of the nature of the universe." And does not Lord Brougham exemplify this observation in his own mode of accounting for final causes? thus, "Had I to accomplish this purpose, I should have used some such means; or had I used these means, I should have thought I was accomplishing some such purpose." (p. 78.) Mark, again, how this statement of Lord Brougham is anticipated by Bacon in another Essay (vol. i. p. 133); he says, "Men make themselves, as it were, the mirror and rule of nature. It is incredible what a number of idols have been introduced into philosophy by the reduction of natural operations to a correspondence with human actions,—that is, by imagining nature acts as a man does, which is not much better than the heresy of the anthropomorphites that sprung up in the cells and solitude of ignorant monks." The interpreters of final causes (final causes being* a hysteron-pro-

* Buffon says, "Car ceux qui croient y repondre par des causes finales ne font pas attention qu'ils prennent l'effet pour la cause." (tom. iii. p. 44.)

teron, a postliminious preface,) are not only presumptuous, but pernicious to the credit of the subject matter; for when they mistake facts they injure their cause by their ignorance, and when their explanations fall short of what they propose to effect, they tempt those disposed to concur, if not inopportunely urged, to stand at bay and deny the conclusions which otherwise they would have freely adopted. The final-cause expositor acts dexterously, and he explains and is approved; but some of his expositions are not swallowed glibly, and at last his ingenuity or effrontery failing, he is forced to admit that the question exceeds his capacity, taking discount at the same time for humility by acknowledging the limited scope of man's mind. The final-cause expositors, and the best of them, frequently offend against all discretion. Dr. Roget, in his Bridgewater Treatise, says "he had admitted only such facts as afford manifest evidence of design." (Preface, p. ix.) Yet in speaking of thorns, prickles, &c. on different plants, he dogmatizes that they are intended particularly to prevent them from the molestation of animals, and he instances a nettle. Why should a nettle be so preserved instead of thousands of other plants? But is the nettle unmolested? No, for he says that fifty different species of insects feed upon it. (vol. ii. p. 59.) Verily we may, with the old Roman in Shakespear, remark, "We call a nettle but a nettle, and the faults of fools but folly." This is, however, but the

beginning and basis of the extravagance, for he subjoins, "the sting of the nettle is of this class, and its structure bears a striking analogy to that of the poisonous fangs of serpents." (vol. i. p. 94.) Why is the rattlesnake,—which, by the by, bears to be thawed and frozen alternately without ceasing to live,—protected by so potent a defence; or rather why is he armed against all animals that may inadvertently approach his retreat, and thus deserve, in respect to the final causes of his fangs and poison, the title of *Crotalus horridus*?

The arguers and interpreters of final causes are not less at variance with facts than with circumstances. Professor Buckland declares that the stays of the plesiosaurus were intended to protect the frailty of the form of this extinct race, because without this peculiar investment it would be destitute of defence; that is, it was made weak by nature to be artificially strengthened by nature. Again, these writers are enraptured with the provident arrangement which enables the gazelle, antelope, deer, &c., by their swiftness and watchfulness to escape their natural enemies, and then they express equal admiration that these natural enemies have their feet covered with hair to deaden the sound of their approaching feet; and further, that they are particularly formed for surprise by bounding on their prey. Dr. Roget adds, "Lions and tigers, who feed on gazelles and the like, have jaws and teeth formed for mastication and the destruction of life." (vol. ii. p. 145.) Thus it is clear,

these final causes counteract each other: one set of animals are qualified by nature to eat the other, and these are aided by nature not to be eaten by them; though they supply their means of living. This is the philosophy of final causes, which is to teach us wisdom, not only beyond Bacon's science, but in opposition to his sagacity; and this philosophy is honoured by the Edinburgh Review, No. 121, and which glorifies the final-cause observations in Roget's treatise, proving, says the reviewer, "*the provident arrangement of the creation*," and adding, that "*knowledge is the wing wherewith we fly to heaven*": aye, *sic itur ad astra*.

The final-causers also say that nature always acts by the simplest means. Why, the *Crotalus horridus* just mentioned has two hundred vertebræ. The common earthworm has more than half that number of holes on its back for vital purposes. Lyonnet counted in one species of caterpillar four thousand muscular bands; and Roget (vol. i. p. 69.) speaks of the eye of the cod-fish in the following words: "This little spherical body, scarcely larger than a pea, is composed of five millions of fibres, which lock into one another by means of more than sixty-two thousand five hundred millions of teeth." I repeat, I am not so monstrously absurd as to object to nature in the arrangement of the world and of its inhabitants, but I object to the self-sufficiency of the animal man, that atom on the fidgets, assuming that his capacity embraces the principles, progress, and

destination of all beings animate and inanimate. This outdoes Protagoras, who said, "Man is the measure of all things." Again, the descanters on final causes recapitulate the ingenuity and efforts of nature in the production and maintenance of children. Those who press overbearingly these points challenge persons otherwise unobservant to recollect that many children are stillborn, and that one half of those born alive die in the first years of infancy; and they make this remark not to depreciate nature, as their opponents might insinuate, but to check their verbose and tyrannous presumption. It is also stated by them that nature is most anxious to perpetuate the races of animals and to extend life over the surface of the globe. Yet, not to speak of lands once populous now deserted, the earth has been repeatedly overwhelmed, millions of beings having been swept about the globe, and sunk and drowned; huddled together, or separated incongruously, in respect to climates, zones, and earth, and ocean; while long before these elemental excesses, still greater revolutions smote the globe, and worlds of animals have been so entirely extinguished that their existence is only known by their occasionally disinterred fossil remains. To refer to a great name on this subject lately deceased: Cuvier says "that the revolutions and changes on the earth's surface have been numerous" (p. 9.); "that oviparous quadrupeds are more frequent than viviparous quadrupeds; that they are more abundant, larger, and more various

in the older layers than at the actual surface of the globe" (p. 67.); and he gives the following summary at p. 225: "It is certain that we are at present at least in the midst of a fourth succession of terrestrial animals; and that after the age of reptiles, after that of palæotheria, after that of mammoths, mastodonta and megatheria, the age arrived in which the human species, together with some domestic animals, governs and fertilizes the earth peaceably; and it is only in formations subsequent to this period, in alluvial deposits, in turf-bogs, in the recent concretions, that those bones are found in a fossil state which all belong to animals known and now existing." In whatever way we consider the language and doctrine of these self-instituted interpreters of nature, their arrogance startles us; yet, with all their self-sufficiency and superciliousness, they are often as lost in the fields of speculation as those vulgar Athenians mentioned by Hobhouse, who consider the ancient statues real bodies, but enchanted for a time in their present petrifaction; or as the Siberians, who believe that the mighty fossil bones found in their country belonged to creatures which still continue to live beneath the earth; or as the Esquimaux, who on seeing ships asked Sacheuse if they could fly as well as sail, (Fisher, Philips's Voyages, p. 59.) a conjecture not so extraordinary, by the by, as Kepler's, who in his early speculation thought that the planets were animals which floated round the sun with wings. Yet none of these modern Athe-

nians, Siberians, or Esquimaux extended their deductions to final causes. It is surprising that men do not hesitate to pronounce their opinions on matters so remote from their possible cognizance. Their daily errors in speculation might chasten their arrogance, for nothing is more common in their explanations than to mistake not only the intent but the object, and this not merely in natural things but in artificial objects, and it happens that the meanest appearances are sometimes honoured with the sublimest commentary. Salt relates the following anecdote: "The French represented four flying birds with human heads like cherubs, which they conjectured most happily to be the souls of the blessed after passing through the ordeal judgement; but unfortunately, it happens, on examining these cherubs with a light they proved to be gazelles' or goats' heads reversed, rather a common representation on the tombs, the horns being mistaken for birds legs, the ears for their tails, and the neck where it is cut off for the wings," &c. (Salt's Life, vol. ii. p. 50.) Here is a specimen of the blunders of men respecting things made by human hands. Daily and hourly men mistake the motives and objects of men, their fellows of their own profession; they mistake flagrantly and notoriously their own motives for their own actions, yet they pronounce authoritatively on the cause and purposes of vegetable and animal life, and the causes of all things on the earth and in the heavens,—neither,

most certainly, made by man, he himself being earth-born and earth-buried. Yet how contrary, doubly so if possible, is their presumption, even taking Roget as our director; he says: "The more an organ of sense differs in its structure from those which we ourselves possess, the more uncertain must be our knowledge of its functions." (vol. ii. p. 572.) This observation regards animals corresponding with us in various ways, and it applies to organs of sense common to us and them. But has the Deity, embracing the universe in his mightiness, organs and senses like man's; or have we rationally any grounds for drawing any conclusion respecting the mode of his energy and apprehension? Affirmatively none, though negatively we might perhaps assume that the Deity must be very dissimilar from man; yet weak man pronounces on the objects, purposes, and designs of God, as if God and man were homogeneal and grew up together, and served the same apprenticeship, and were confidential associates in preparing the infinite arrangements in the great laboratory of space; yet to reproduce one of the simplest organic products by an artificial combination of its elements has baffled all the efforts of modern philosophers. The doctrine of final causes implies transcendental egotism and impertinence. Hence surely Bacon was justified in referring arguments from such sources to *impotentia mentis*.

I have stated that Lord Brougham's Natural Theology is in some measure a preface to his

intended edition of Paley's Natural Theology. The present essay conforms in many respects to Paley's work, even to the commencing illustration of their common argument. Both in fact begin with the eye. Paley also in his preliminary remarks has a whimsical discussion on what, for want of a title from the ancient dialecticians, may be designated *lost and found.* He says, "Suppose I had found a watch on the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place."—(*Why, O Paley, you would say it was dropped there.*)—He then proceeds, supposing he had inspected the watch, " We perceive that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e. g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day," &c. p. 1. (*Excellent guess! I, Paley, having the ditto in my fob.*) He then runs over the different parts of the work of the watch, concluding, " The inference, we think, is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker, that there must have existed, at some time and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer, who comprehended its construction and designed its use." (p. 3.) This argument is continued through the first two chapters; it is the basis of the whole volume. Never was any position more gratuitous or sophistical. What sort of person and in what state of society, to give any colour to the device, is this

hypothetical watch-finder? Civilized or otherwise, skilled in mechanism or ignorant of its rudiments? For any purpose of reasoning or illustration he should be considered as having no knowledge of watches. Now, suppose a watch dropped among savages—suppose it going: it is taken up; it might be imagined they would regard it on the ground for some time with surprise if not with alarm: the hands move, it ticks. Suppose it laid open and inspected; so far from ignorant people believing it was a machine made by their fellow man, they would probably refer it to supernatural agency, if they speculated on cause and effect, or assume that it was one of an unknown class of living things propagated by parents or growing like plants. In the South Sea islands nails were so considered, and a native sowed the second that he had obtained, expecting it would produce a crop of nails when the yams were ready to be dug. But Paley's watch-finder is not an unenlightened man, but a very peculiar adept; he is skilled in many branches of mechanism. Paley exhibits him impliedly as never having seen a watch, yet knowing all its construction, and that not as an apprentice but as a master artist, for he says that after inspecting it in motion he was satisfied "that if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none

which would have answered the use that is now served by it. So much for this original watch-finder, at once ignorant and scientific, who at sight concluded that the watch had a maker; that it was made as it ought to be, on a careful examination of all its parts; and that if made otherwise it would not have gone at all, or gone most imperfectly, a presumptuous conclusion whether made by Paley in his own person or not, and false, for watches may be of very different construction yet keep time with equal accuracy. Thus Paley imagines a case and assumes facts to ground dramatically the superstructure of theology on final causes. This extravagance is not a casual error on some extraneous or auxiliary point, but a primitive, inherent, absolute, elaborate, absurdity, on which his whole argument begins, proceeds, and concludes. Paley then discusses the formation of the eye or eyes, and some of the lower animals have eight; he says, "There is precisely the same proof that the eye was made for vision, as there is that the telescope was made for assisting it; the fact is, they are both instruments." (p. 14.) This argument he discusses in detail. Lord Brougham follows him: "The same induction of facts which leads us to a knowledge of the structure of the eye and its functions on the animal economy, leads us to the knowledge of its adaptation to the properties of light. It is a truth in physics, in the strictest sense of the word, that vision is performed by the eye refracting light and making it converge to

a focus upon the retina. Upon the same evidence which all natural science rests, reposes the knowledge that the eye is an optical instrument. This is a truth common to both physics and theology. Before the days of Sir Isaac Newton, men knew that they saw by means of the eye, that the eye was constructed on principles; but the reasons of its peculiar conformation they knew not, because they were ignorant of the different refrangibility of light: when his discoveries taught this truth it was found to have been acted upon, and consequently known by, the Being * who created the eye. Still our knowledge was imperfect, and it was reserved to Mr. Dollond, to discover another law of nature, the different dispersive powers of different substances, which enabled him to compound an object-glass that more effectually corrected the various refrangibility of the rays. It has been observed that this truth must have been known to the maker of the eye, for upon its basis is that instrument far more perfect than the achromatic glass of Dollond, &c." (p. 30.) But Lord Brougham does not conclude his argument as Paley, who queried, "It may be asked, why should not the Deity have

* It may be thought that Newton countenanced such familiarity of expression, but this is not so. Newton was accused of atheism for a paragraph in his Optics. (Baily's Account of Flamsteed, p. 229.) This probably occasioned the following cautionary quære by Newton in his Optics, and quoted by Lord Brougham: "How came the bodies of animals to be contrived with so much art, and for what end were the several parts? Was the eye contrived without skill in optics, and the ear without knowledge of sound?" (p. 151.)

given to the animal the faculty of vision at once? Why this circuitous perception the ministry of so many means; an element provided for the purpose reflected from opake substances; refracted through apparent ones?" Which Paley answers: "It is only by the display of contrivance that the existence, the agency, the wisdom of the Deity could be testified to his rational creatures. This is the scale by which we ascend to the knowledge of our Creator which we possess, so far as it depends upon the phenomena or the works of nature." (p. 30.) This appears to me, to use all possible temperance in language, passing strange. Lord Brougham brings forward the Deity with Newton and Dollond as opticians of the same school, while Paley affirms that the Deity complicated the means of vision, in order by the display of contrivance to testify to his rational creatures his own ingenuity and wisdom; that is to say, the eye is an elaborate instrument not so much for the service of those who see, but as a means at once mysterious and revealed to improve their belief in Natural Theology*. This is surprising considering who and on what occasion such dogmas are proclaimed. What! to suppose they advance

* S. Turner improves on this extravagance: "I cannot but believe that one of the great purposes of the Deity in creating the insect kingdom was to excite this sentiment (the resurrection) in the human heart, and to raise by it the contemplative mind to look forward to a possible revival from the tomb, as the butterfly from the sepulchral chrysalis." (Creation, &c., p. 458. Fifth edit.)

the doctrine of an overruling Providence, that they exalt that great Cause, universal, immortal, and unchanged, by attributing to him chemical and mechanical speculations in handicraft and technical language! Dugald Stewart said, "When I study the intellectual powers of man in the writings of Hartley, of Priestley, of Darwin, of Tooke, I feel as if I were examining the sorry mechanism that gives motion to a puppet." And if there be any truth in this feeling of Stewart, what must be the sentiments of those who witness authors exhibiting the Deity in their pages as a chamber artizan, composing and compounding eyes, &c. for this very puppet? From the eye Paley proceeds to other parts of the body, then to birds. The following exposes the difficulty of procuring examples, though now all natural history is employed as votive offerings for this purpose, to extend the dominion of final causes. Paley says, "In the small order of birds which winter with us, from the snipe downwards, let the external colour of the feathers be what it will, their creator has universally given them a bed of black down next their bodies. Black we know is the warmest colour, and the purpose here is to keep in the heat arising from the heart and the circulation of the blood. It is further likewise remarkable, that this is not found in large birds; for which there is also a reason: small birds are much more exposed to the cold than large ones, forasmuch as they present in proportion to their bulks a much larger surface to the

air." (p. 173.) If black be the warmest colour, why in Norway, as Mr. Clarke says, do the people prefer white kine for their hardihood? And again, if Paley be orthodox, nature mistakes when some animals brown in summer, change in hyperborean regions on the approach of winter their dark hair for grey. So much by innuendo on colours and final causes! But why does Paley resort to England as the region where nature especially exhibits her ingenuity by lining the feathers of small birds with black down? Beckford in his Excursion in Portugal mentions (p. 160.) a lady bird-fancier who decided that England had no native birds because the country was too cold; and a Jesuit, probably the confessor, who was of the company confirmed the lady's observation by quoting the indisputable authority of Camoens:

> A Grande Inglaterra, che de neve
> Boreal sempre abunda.

But setting all this aside as surplusage, why did Paley specify snipes on this occasion? Snipes are not peculiar to England, nor even to Europe; on the contrary, to use the words of the Scotch Encyclopedia, "they are universal birds, in every quarter of the globe and in all climates." After birds, Paley exercises his ingenuity in working out the doctrine of final causes on fishes. One instance deserves a passing remark: "The shell of a lobster's tail in its articulation and overlappings represents the jointed part of a coat of mail, or rather, which I believe to be the truth, a coat of

mail is in imitation * of a lobster's shell." (p. 267.) The lobster's tail is a final cause certainly, but here it is cause upon cause, or, as the lawyers say, cause and cross cause. As Paley drew a final cause from the black inside down of small birds, he draws a final cause from the inside lining of large quadrupeds: "Another perfection of the animal mass is the *package*, I know nothing which is so surprising. Examine the contents of the trunk of any large animal." &c. p. 149. Paley also professes to explain by final causes famines, blights, &c.: he says, "What we call famines and blights are oftentimes legions of animated beings claiming their portions in the bounty of nature. What corrupts the produce of the earth to us prepares it for them, and it is by means of their rapid multiplication that they may take possession of their pasture; a slow propagation would not meet the opportunity." (p. 374.) Then Paley is at issue with uncle Toby; that the world is large enough for you and me he denies; and the final cause obtrudes adversely, for Paley holds that man

* The following is still more pleasant of the *genus imitabile* man. D. Hildredth says the cicadæ or locusts of North America, "Make a great noise and screaming with their air-bladders or bagpipes. These bags are placed under, and rather behind, the wings in the axilla, something in the manner of using the bagpipes with the bags under the arms. I could compare them to nothing else; and, indeed, I suspect the first inventor of the instrument borrowed his ideas from some insect of this kind. They play a variety of notes and sounds, one of which nearly imitates the scream of the tree toad." This I quote from *Brewster's Natural Magic.*

should perish in order that legions of flies and vermin should enjoy the bounty of nature. Paley is often homely, but expressive in his language, as about the *package* in the trunk which I have mentioned; he also deals sometimes too fervently in the reality; while in the following illustration there is something of pastoral gallantry, which brings flirtation within the vortex of final causes. He writes: "The glowworm is a female caterpillar, the male of which is a fly, lively, comparatively small, dissimilar to the female in appearance; probably also distinguished from her in habits, pursuits and manners, as he is unlike in form and external construction. Here then is the adversity of the case. The caterpillar cannot meet her companion in the air, the winged rover disdains the ground. They might therefore never be brought together, did not this radiant torch direct the volatile mate to his sedentary female. In this example we also see the resources of art anticipated. One grand operation of chemistry is the making of phosphorus: and it was thought an ingenious device to make phosphoric matches supply the place of lighted tapers; now this very thing is done in the body of the glowworm." (p. 263.) Excellent archdeacon; —so the glowworm is the quasi inventor of this phosphorus, and it originated with the gallantry of life and love and final causes! Lord Brougham, true to his text, does not forget the glowworm, though he does not display it with all the radiance, and as the poet Thomson would say, the effusive

force of his predecessor. He says: "Thus it is pleasing to find that the properties of two curves so exceedingly unlike as the ellipse and hyperbola closely resemble each other, or that appearances so dissimilar as the motion of the moon and the fall of an apple from the tree are different forms of the same fact; it affords a pleasure of the same kind to discover that the light of the glow-worm and the song of the nightingale are both provisions of nature for the same end of attracting the animal's mate and continuing its kind." (p. 183.) Thus Lord Brougham adds to the glowing lady a companion piece of the serenading gentleman. On this interesting topic of final causes in defence of Natural Theology might be added with equal propriety the courtship in the owling time of night of the death-watch. The noise made by the male, the terror of many midnight listeners, is the "Come hither" to his coy sweetheart; and, strange to say, he effects this love-note by knocking his forehead against the timber in the chamber, the bed-post, or window-shutter: hence, of course, the caveat *Fronti nulla fides* is referable to the unrequited love of the female death-watch. Paley among his final causes considers night as kindly provided for the sleep of animals: he says, "The last relation of this kind which I shall mention is that of sleep to night, and it appears to me to be a relation which was expressly intended. Two points are manifested: first, that the animal frame requires sleep; secondly, that night brings with it a silence and a cessation of activity which allows of sleep being taken

without interruption and without loss." (p. 232.) *Oh, day and night, but this is wondrous strange!* But could not eyes close when disposed to sleep without the curtain of the night being drawn? Do not many animals, and man among the rest, sleep throughout the day; and do not some awake as the sun declines, and enjoy all their faculties and activity at midnight? To suppose that the fixed sun * and the revolving earth regarded sleeping and waking animals is as probable as that night and day typified the sport of hide and seek among children. After this we need not be surprised that Paley considered astronomy† as

* Dr. Gisborne in his Natural Theology was chagrined at the liberality of Paley. The Quarterly Review (No. 41. p. 49.) reflects properly on Gisborne's allusion to the days of the creation, saying, "He would satisfy himself in dismissing, though with reverential awe, the account, merely in compliance with popular ideas which represent the sun as a kind of secondary to the earth, and subservient along with the moon, its companion or even equal, to the uses of the globe we inhabit." Let the Reviewer not be sure of that; many uphold that the sun and moon move round the earth. There are conservatives in astronomy as in politics. By an advertisement in the London journals it appears that Mr. Finlayson has published a work, *with plates*, in which he disproves *the false and fabricated solar system of Sir Isaac Newton*, showing that the sun, moon, and stars move round the earth; and he further proves that the ten tribes are to be restored in 1836. This is the sixth edition of the work in a few years. Newton's Principia did not come to a second till thirty years after the issue of the first. What Euler said of Newton and the English still continues; his discoveries were received by all but his countrymen: *Missis igitur quorundam Anglorum.*

† He says that astronomy is not the best medium to prove the agency of an intelligent Creator. (p. 267.) Aristotle thought otherwise. Cicero quotes the passage in *de Natura Deorum*, from a lost work of Aristotle.

rather unsuitable to afford proofs in favour of theology.

Paley professes to have felt no difficulty in accounting for all natural incidents by final causes, with the exception of the mammæ of male animals. He says, "I confess myself wholly at a loss to guess at a reason either final or efficient for this part of the animal frame, unless there be some foundation for an opinion, of which I draw the hint from a paper of Sir Everard Home, that the mammæ of the fœtus may be fixed before the sex is determined." (p. 340.) But why might they not be intended to enable males to suckle the young in case of necessity, for such has occurred? Humboldt relates in his American travels, and it is also repeated in a digest of them in the Cabinet Library, that on the death of a mother, the father took the babe to bed, and suckled it, and that the child was reared by this means. Such are the leading points of the lauded and popular treatise of Paley: he explains and specifies the purposes, means, and consummation of the Deity's will in all things presented to our senses; he is positive respecting the objects and designs of the great Cause, universal and unchanged; yet Paley is not positive respecting circumstances immediately connected with mankind, and he not only hesitates, but professes ignorance of the cause of some of the enjoyments of his fellow men, and even of the causes of his own repeated pleasures and pursuits. He says, "We can give no account whatever of our pleasure

in the simple and original perception; and even when physical sensations are assumed we can seldom account for them in the secondary and complicated shapes in which they take the name of diversions. I never yet met with a sportsman who could tell me in what the sport consisted; who could resolve it into its principle, and state that principle. I have been a great follower of fishing myself, and in its cheerful solitude have passed some of the happiest hours of a sufficiently happy life; but to this moment I could never trace out the source of the pleasure which it afforded me." (p. 383.)

Paley's Natural Theology being disposed of, I recur to Lord Brougham's Essay on the same subject. He proposes, as I have stated, to add to Paley's work an illustrative commentary, which he states has been for some time in forwardness. In the tract now to be considered he repeats many of Paley's examples, and throughout adopts, as I have also stated, his reference to final causes; for example, and I quote his words: "When a bird's egg is examined, it is found to consist of three parts, the chick, the yolk in which the chick is placed, and the white in which the yolk swims; the yolk is lighter than the white, and it is attached to it at two points, joined by a line, or rather plane, below the centre of gravity of the yolk. From this arrangement it must follow that the chick is always uppermost roll the egg how you will, consequently the chick is always kept nearest the breast or belly of the mother while she

is sitting." Now, supposing that eggs on being rolled take that position, it does not follow that eggs, after frequent disturbance by the hen's feet and bill in the nest, must in that concave receptacle always present the chick side uppermost. The upset of the eggs by the hen is so frequent, that henwives say that the mother anxiously turns the eggs in order that every part of each egg may receive its due portion of the warmth of her body. The fallacy of Lord Brougham's assertion may be proved, by the curious in hatching, by marking with a pencil the upper surface of the eggs in a nest, and noticing if, on successive days, the same marks retain the same position. Lord Brougham concludes the paragraph by saying, "This leads by a single step to another truth in Natural Theology, that the egg must have been formed by some hand skilful in mechanism, and acting under the knowledge of dynamics." (p. 34.) To introduce the Deity disposing a chick in an egg that it may be more easily hatched, marvellously offends the *nec Deus intersit*: and then Lord Brougham referring to the Deity's hand directed by his skill in dynamics! Such language is beneath a pagan's application to one of the *dii minores*. Lord Brougham seems to exceed the authors of the Bridgewater treatises in the detail of his references; he descants on the knee-pan, on the elastic cushion of the ostrich, on the web-feet of the water-fowl, on the flexor tendon of the duck, &c., on all of which he concludes: "These are facts

learnt by induction; the inductive science of dynamics shows us that such mechanism is calculated to answer the end which, in point of fact, is attained. To conclude from thence that the mechanist contrived the means with the intention of producing the end with the knowledge of the science is also strictly an inference of induction." (p. 37.) Thus the Deity is called a mechanist—learned in optics, in projectiles, in dynamics, &c.; and he draws the conclusion, that because animals act so and so, they were purposely made to act so from some preconceived type. I do not deny this; it may be so; yet here I cannot refrain from quoting a cautious remark of Paley: "To this great variety in organized life the Deity has given, or perhaps there arises out of it, a corresponding variety of animal appetites." (Natural Theology, p. 270, c. 19.) Before I proceed further, and perhaps I should have before stated, that those who would regulate all things by final causes assume that the world and all that it contains was made in time, or, to use the common expression, was created. Creation, according to some, implied an arrangement of chaos; others use the term as originating the world from nothing. Barrow would prove that, according to Scripture, God made the world out of nothing (Sermon, xii. v. 2.); and South asserts that it is as suitable to our natural notions to conceive the world produced from nothing, and *de novo*, as to conceive the world to have had a beginning. (Sermons,

vol. i. p. 46.) It may be so; all inconceivables are superlative; but if it be so the statement requires us, according to our natural notions, not to conclude but to remain undecided. To prove a creation many very odd fancies have been propagated, and even by men of the rarest genius, as Leibnitz, who imagined that he saw in the binary arithmetic the image of the creation, which he communicated to the jesuit Grimaldi, President of the Tribunal of Mathematics in China, in hopes that this emblem of the creation would convert the emperor to Christianity, because he was passionately fond of mathematics. Some presume to name the year and day of the creation; the Hindoos assert that the world began on a Sunday at sunrise, and they add that the Deluge began on a Friday. (Colebrook's Sanscrit; Algebra, p. 44.) I do not say that the world was not created and had not a beginning, but there are no proofs that the world was not, or that it was made in time; neither do I say that plants and animals, &c. have not been created, or that there have not been successive creations; indeed, conjecturally, we might conclude from geological discoveries, that after great periods or cycles new plants and animals sprang into being: monkeys* and men seem to have been an

* Cuvier says, "It is wonderful that, among all these mammifera, of which, at the present day, the greater part have a congerminate species in the warm climates, there has not been one quadrumanous animal, not a single bone or a single tooth of a monkey, not even a bone or a tooth of an extinct species of this animal. Neither are there any remains

after production; though man, by a sort of borough-English in nature, though last-born of animals, enjoys the primogenitureship of the earth. Yet there is no actual proof of originating any organized beings, and the lowest vegetable is in this respect as prerogative as the most exalted animal. Ray spoke loosely of a seminal tincture in the earth; but lichens and mosses, and the green things that mantle on the pool, and smear our walls like blots on unsized paper, grow from seed or sets as certainly as the monsters of the forest or the plain, the Indian fig-tree, the baobob, the dragon-tree, and the largest of all, the *Cupressus* disticha.* Every germ has had an ancestor, and the ephemera and the infusoriæ have pedigrees as long as the elephant and hippopotamus. So, likewise, all things change and are transformed, not merely as the grub to the chrysalis and fly, but as varying their form, particularly in the early stages of their development. Then, again, as all things dissolve, they reassemble their disbanded atoms which are corrupted and putrefied; even the air, the breath of the world, becomes infectious, while it is again ventilated and refreshed by itself, and becomes the medium of vigorous life. Throughout nature death is but

---

of man. (On the Surface of the Globe, p. 224.) It may be stated here that in Malabar they say monkeys were men, but on account of their laziness tails were given them. (Dr. Fryer-Forbes, Oriental Memoirs.)

* Humboldt mentions one 76 feet in circumference, and another 118 feet in South America.

a pause, a relay in the everlasting journey, never ending, still beginning; that which dies revives, and thence under this persuasion the Jews utter no contradiction in calling the burial place "the house of the living." The belief that the world, earth, planets, sun, stars were made in time, arises from the common vanity of man, "who is of few days." Man was born, therefore the earth was once in swaddling-clothes; yet, though man was born of parents, nature affords no coincident genealogy of worlds. But man makes himself the measure and the height of all things; the earth and heavens were formed for him; the earth was convulsed for his convenience; and some affirm that vegetables were sunk 190 fathoms, perhaps far deeper, and were converted into coal, in anticipation of his want of fuel. Hence he is the object of rain and dry weather, of storms and earthquakes,—opiate visions, holiday musings; he is the drift and purpose of all the casualties and courses in air, earth, and water, whether enjoying good or suffering evil. When Brindley replied to a question, For what purpose were rivers formed? he replied, "To feed navigable canals:" and in this answer he only exceeded the common staple of human vanity by adding to man's self-sufficiency the impertinence of the engineer. Hence the notion of spirits being busy about man, for his conceit fills the world with flimsy beings; dæmons flutter in the atmosphere, and labour beneath the earth. Agricola in his book *De*

Animalibus Subterraneis, talks of spirits counter-working miners. These are only a small department of the subterraneous malignants who torment mankind. The earth abounds with these ministering agents, and some vouch for their activity. Baxter, in his book on the Soul, affirms that dreams are prompted by separate immaterial beings; and Gregory in his Life of Hall, p. 80, says "he defends this theory with much ingenuity." Yet a still greater egotism than peopling the earth and air with dæmons was the opinion not long since generally entertained, that the configuration* of the stars at the birth of babes ruled their future destinies, and that comets and eclipses portended confusion to kings and nations. Yet greater, far greater than all these mortal absurdities is or was the opinion that the moon, planets, sun, stars, and the whole host of heaven were moulded and launched into space to adorn the earth, because it is man's abode. What is man when the earth itself is, as Laplace says, "qu'un point insensible dans l'immensité de l'espace"? (Méchanique Céleste, t. ii. p. 598.) Why, the comets alone which visit the planetary orbits are conjectured by Monsieur Arago to amount to seven millions. Then, how various! how prolonged in their courses! Some

* Tutti nascono sottoposti ai segni
Che si chiamono quà giù corpi celesti.
Boyardo, Orlando Innamorato, c. 2.

Bodin mentions an exception: "Car tous les astrologues mêmes demeurent d'accord, que les sages ne sont point sujets aux astres." (De la République, liv. iv. p. 449.)

employ a few years; others, as those which appeared in 1680, 1763, 1811, are calculated to require 515 years, 3383 years, 7334 years, to complete the periods of their respective return. Of the stars, they are classed under sixteen degrees of brightness. Herschel says they "are infinite in the only sense in which we can assign a meaning to the word." (p. 377.) The milky way alone, he says, consists of stars, scattered by millions. (p. 163.) Then their distance; the nearest must be at least forty millions of miles from our system, while the furthest exceeds all calculation. Some of them already discovered by glasses (and every improvement in the telescope exhibits new stars,) would require a thousand years to transmit their light to the earth. Though the sun's light reaches the earth in seven or eight minutes, but the stars referred to would require a thousand years to transmit their light to the earth; and Huygens carries the distance of some stars much further, conjecturing that these would require six thousand years to produce the same effect. I affirm nothing: the world may have been created, may have been made in time, even a short time ago, and may be soon destroyed*; but I state there are philosophically no facts to induce any such conclusion, and to use the emphatic words of the greatest mathematician of

* Latimer said, "For the world was ordained of God to endure as Scripture, and all learned men agree six thousand years." (Sermon, Day of Judgement, p. 261.)

modern times, "there is no intimation that the world had a beginning, nor any prospect that it shall have an end."

Those who argue on final causes, as I have said repeatedly, refer all things directly or indirectly to man; he is the text, the commentary, and the interpreter; in consequence, they talk of the personality of the Deity, and none is more positive in this assumption than Paley and Lord Brougham. Paley is very particular; he says personality relates to a person, a person is an individual, and that God is infinite in essence and powers. (p. 321.) Those who represented God under a human form were vain and ignorant, though not contradictory; but to talk of an infinite person or individual, individual implying outline and insulation, associates antagonist terms. Here again man's brooding vanity interferes with his reasoning: having assumed the Deity's motives and objects in the formation of animals, and the dependency and motions of the heavenly bodies, because such are agreeable to his notions, he insists that God is a person, because he cannot apprehend how faculties concurring, though vastly superior, with man's can subsist, unless in a person, an individual. Some writers on religious affairs have actually identified God and man. Dr. Clarke said "that the relations, respects, and proportions of things are just as they appear to our understanding." Hence those who assume a similar intellect between God and man add a further resemblance,

and as man is a person, the personality of the Deity follows of course. In the religious mysteries they represented God with a gilt face. Happy and respectful would it be if the moderns had the discretion of the philosophers in the benighted period of paganism, as Euclid, who being asked what were the Gods, and in what they rejoiced, answered, "This only I know with certainty, that they hate the inquisitive*." I pass over what Lord Brougham says of *à priori* reasoning; and I come to that portion of his discourse which regards the soul, or mind, terms used indifferently by him. In this part of the disquisition he claims the merit of novelty, for he says, "Nothing is more remarkable than the care with which all writers upon this subject, (Natural Theology,) at least among the moderns, have confined themselves to the proofs afforded by the visible and sensible works of nature, while the evidence furnished by the mind and its operations has been wholly neglected. The celebrated book of Ray on the wonders of the creation seems to assume that the human soul has no separate existence, that it forms no part of the created system." (p. 52.) He also specifies Paley in this rebuke, remarking that he never mentions the mind, nor any of the intellectual phænomena (p. 53.); adding, "Thus all these authors view the revolu-

* Τα μεν αλλα ουχ' οιδα τοις μεν τοι Φιλοπραγμονας οτι μισουσι ασφαλως οιδα.

tion of the heavenly* bodies, the structure of animals, the organization of plants, and the various operations of the material world which we see carried on around us as indicating the existence of design and leading to a knowledge of the creation, but they pass over in silence, unaccountably enough, by far the most singular work of divine wisdom and power—the mind." (p. 54.) This he calls, *unaccountable*, though he accounts for it by saying, "Their habits of thinking led them to consider matter as the only certain existence, as that which composed the universe, as alone forming the subject of our contemplation, as furnishing the only materials of our inquiries whether respecting structure or habits and operation. They had no firm, definite, precise idea of any other existence respecting which they could reason or speculate." (p. 55.) Thus accounting explicitly for what he calls an unaccountable omission: and many will concur in the propriety of their reserve. Yet it appears that as they in their apprehension avoided to discuss the mind, Lord Brougham met the question with chivalrous dogmatism, for what can be asserted more positively and authoritatively than that "the evidence of the existence of mind

* We may say in opposition that it is strange Lord Brougham has neglected astronomy in this part of his subject, of which Laplace says truly, "L'astronomie par la dignité de son objet et la perfection de ses theories, est le plus beau monument de l'esprit humain le titre le plus noble de son intelligence." (Laplace, Mechanique Celeste, t. ii. p 398)

is to the full as complete as that upon which we believe in the existence of matter. Indeed it is more certain and more irrefragable?" (p. 56.) Adding, "of the two existences, then, that of the mind as independent of matter is more certain than that of matter apart of mind;" (p. 57.) that is, matter is less certain than immateriality. This rivals the extravagance of the Vedanti school, and the verbiage of Bishop Berkeley's sophistry. Lord Brougham proceeds in the same strain: at page 110 he enounces beyond his own superlative dogmatism,—thus "it may be further observed that the material world affords no example of creation any more than of annihilation. (True.) Such as it was in point of quantity since its existence began, such it still is, not a single particle of matter having been either added to it or taken from it. (Very true.) Change, unceasing change of all its parts at every instant of time it is for ever undergoing, but though the combinations or relations of these parts are unremittingly varying, there has not been a single one of them created, or a single one destroyed. (Very true.) Of mind this cannot be said; it is called into existence perpetually before our eyes. In one respect this may weaken the argument for the continued existence of the soul, because it may lead to the conclusion, that as we see mind created, so it may be destroyed, while matter, which suffers no addition, is liable to no loss." First, observe how loose is his language; he uses synonymously *mind called into existence*

before our eyes and *mind created :* they are not identical expressions; to be born is to be called into existence, but this is not creation. And how can children who are not created have created minds? Then what does he mean by *the mind called into existence before our eyes?* There is no such display of instant illumination; the human intellect grows like other faculties and powers; man in the beginning of his existence is not mentally or bodily more, but less favoured than many other beings. The organs of all animals do not coexist simultaneously in the germ of life, but are successively formed, and often of parts which gradually coalesce and in time become fully developed. Besides, the human embryo endures various metamorphoses; at one period it possesses branchiæ similar to the cartilaginous fishes, a heart with a single set of cavities, a brain of a longitudinal series of tubercles; then it changes the branchiæ for lungs, while the circulation is single as that of reptiles. What can Lord Brougham mean by the soul created before our eyes? Not in the embryo, which is at first an atom* and then after preparatory changes assumes the figure of a reptile, a fish, a quadruped with a caudal prolongation of the sacrum. Nor does this nine months' wonder when disclosed into

* Roget says truly, "Every individual, vegetable and animal takes its rise from an atom of imperceptible minuteness, and gradually increases in bulk by successive accretions of new matter derived from foreign sources, and by some refined but unknown processes transmuted into its substance." (vol. i. p. 17.)

this breathing world, and when it notifies life legally by crying, exhibit a soul *created before our eyes*; the child from the womb does not at all resemble Minerva when she sprung from the parental head of Jupiter in panoply all-armed. No, for days and nights the infant dozes insensible; then sucks and sleeps, or in moping vicissitude sleeps and sucks; it is scarcely animate, and of all beings of the higher classes few to whom the enjoyment of intellect is so long delayed, none reaches it with more struggling advances. Yet to talk of mind being created or brought into existence before our eyes, intimates something common to vulgarity, and instant as gas inflamed, or at least as the agony of action communicated by the galvanic pile to the extinct being. As the body is confirmed by time and nurture the mind strengthens, and as the senses act and aid each other, the mind exhibits greater activity and resources. Lord Brougham insists that the mind is immaterial and eternal, and eternal because immaterial. Opinions respecting the mind or soul have been various; a few of them may here be mentioned preparatory to resuming the validity of Lord Brougham's argument. Many among the pagans believed or reasoned that souls were eternal *àparte ante*, (Plato Meno, Opera Omnia, p. 415.) and it seems to have been Plato's own opinion (de Legibus, lib. x. p. 949). Socrates considered that souls were immortal, and that they had often been born. Then as to the existence of mind or soul: Orpheus said it was lymph, εστιν

ὑδωρ ψυκη, and death the alteration of it, θανατος δ'ὑδεσσιν αμοι Βη. (Clement, Strom. lib. vi. p. 624.) Empedocles said that the soul subsists in the blood, ψυχη εν τῃ του αἱματος συστασει. (Plutarchus περι των αρεσκοντων τοις φιλοσοφοις, lib. iv. p. 222.) The Jews considered the blood the life, and hence spilling man's blood (Gen. ix. 5.) signified homicide. Zenophanes called the soul πνευμα. (Diog. Laertius, p. 640.) And in Genesis it is said the breath of life was breathed into Adam. At present suspended animation is sometimes restored by inflating the lungs with the natural breath. *Anima* signified breath, life, mind, soul. Others have had very different notions of the mind: La Metherie supposed the mind was composed of a fine species of crystals; and Fearn that it is of definite shape; *to wit*, "a flexible spherule." (p. 293.) Dr. Okeley held that the material of souls was caloric. Then respecting the position of the soul: Lucretius considered the heart to be the residence of the soul; so do the people in the Tonga Islands according to Mariner (vol. ii. p. 121.); and Descartes fixed on the pineal gland. Supposing the nature of the soul to be ascertained, and its locality in man, other questions arise, as how it got into the body and became domiciliated. Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato, Zenocrates, Cleanthes thought it was inserted from without, θυρα θεν εις κρινεσθαι τον νουν. (Apud Stobæum, Ecc. Phys., lib. i. p. 93.)

This insertion of the soul into the body according to some was effected in the embryo state: "Ani-

mas aiunt cabalistæ sive singulares, sive e massa, ut loquuntur, ideali educendas innumeras semper existere, atque ex hisce in corpore humano seu embryones immissis fieri humanes." (Selden de J. N. et Gentium, lib. ii. c. 4. p. 163.) So in the Zendavesta it is written, " Lorsque le corps de l'homme est formé dans le ventre de la mère l'ame qui vient du ciel s'y etablit. (tom. ii. p. 384.) Supposing body and soul different and distinct at any time, whence were the souls derived? In Pinkerton's collection of Travels (vol. ix. p. 730.) it is supposed that children in the womb were animated with the souls or minds of those who died before they had attained the age of reason. Yet this only pretends to explain the employment of souls at second-hand, for the original stock and trade are unaccounted for by it. Men have not only contested with one another what the soul is and is not, but some have asserted its duality, its trinity, and even its further complexity. Aristotle considered that the soul was composed of a rational and irrational nature. (Ethic. ad End. t. ii. p. 242. Opera.) Plutarch affirmed that the soul is double (Moralia, p. 371), perhaps as Coleridge talked and speculated on an inner sense of the mind. (Table Talk, v. 2. p. 36.) Whether Coleridge considered this inner sense a quality, or an *ens* according to German verbiage, is not very clear. Many of the Rabbins supposed men had three souls; Monboddo added a fourth, and all immaterial souls. Some reputed the soul a harmony of the five senses. (Plutarch, Moral. p. 223.) St. Pierre was not

(Philosophy of Nature) disposed to advance beyond the last quotation of five souls; yet had he been skilled in anatomy and not horror-struck at materialism he might have admitted a sixth soul, for the brain consists of a congeries or labyrinth of medullary fibres which are continuous with the six columns of the spinal marrow. The Stoics considered the soul to be constituted of eight parts, οκτω ταμερη την ψυχην δεντες. (Ap. Stobæum, Eulog. Phy. p. 108.)* But they mixed up the five senses, the voice, the generative faculty, and the understanding as constituting the mind. Yet in all ages some have been reserved on this subject. Sextus Empiricus said it was incomprehensible, and he drew an argument for this conclusion from the endless controversies on the subject. (De Pyr. Hyp. lib. ii. c. 5. p. 57.) † But not so Lord Brougham, who has added to the controversialists; he declares, as I have repeated, that souls are perpetually *created before our eyes*, though the origin, progress, development of the mind concur with the growth and strength of the body. He also insists, as I have said, strenuously for "the immateriality of the soul;" and he begins his reasoning on this point by what he calls *a psychological argument respecting the Deity's design* ‡

* Plutarch has the same : οἱ Στωϊκοι εξ οκτω μερων φασι συνεστανει, κ τ. αλλα. (Moralia, p. 222.)

† Bishop Watson acknowledged that he knew no more of the soul in his old age than in his infancy.

‡ The Deity's design! Buffon says generally, "Nous trouverons qu'en cela, comme en tout, le plan de la nature est bien différent du canevas de nos idées." (tom. iii. p. 29.)

drawn from the nature of the mind, asserting "that the immateriality of the soul is the foundation of all the doctrines relating to its future state." (p. 100.) The question of materiality or immateriality is one topic, mortality or immortality another. To affirm that on the immateriality of the soul the whole foundation of its immortality rests is unadvised in every sense. Many believe in the immortality of the soul who never heard of its immateriality. Bruce says: "I never heard a savage who separated the belief of a future state from the immortality of the body." (Travels, vol. ii. p. 406.) The burying of arms, dogs, &c. with the dead implies the same, according to the well-known couplet:

> But thinks, admitted to that equal sky,
> His faithful dog shall bear him company.

The Mahometans are altogether bodily in their notions of an hereafter, &c. Lord Brougham continues, "If it consists of material parts, or if it consists of any modification of matter, or if it is inseparably connected with any combination of material elements, we have no reason whatever for believing that it can survive the existence of the physical part of our frame; on the contrary, its destruction seems to follow, as a necessary consequence, the dissolution of the body." This is an argument *in terrorem* to the immortals. Believe, says Lord Brougham, as I teach, the immateriality of the soul, otherwise you must renounce the chance of a future life; for if the soul be material you must die soul and body, without the possibility of a resurrection. He adds with complacency, "Hap-

pily, however, the doctrines of materialism rest upon no solid foundations either of reason or experience; the vague indistinct form of the proposition in which they are conveyed affords one strong argument against their truth." (p. 102.) Yet Lord Brougham, thus charging others with being vague and indistinct, is himself so loose that all who have critically noticed his tract, whether they concur in his opinion or not, have remarked this blemish. He seldom defines his terms; uses, as I have stated, indifferently soul and mind, which I have followed, concluding that he considers them identical; and finally, he talks of the immateriality of the soul in material * language. Is the word immateriality direct or distinct? What can be more indistinct? Immateriality is nothingness in regard to substance. Nothing is not perceived or perceivable. Now Hobbes said, "Knowledge which we call science, I define to be the evidence of truth from some beginning or principle of sense." (Human Nature, p. 63.) But immateriality has no beginning or principle of sense. To talk of the mind and its immateriality is recurring to occult qualities and innate ideas; though I suspect Lord Brougham confounds thinking with the course of thought. To insist that thinking cannot be the result of material agencies seems to me marvellously pre-

* Thus: "The changes which the mind undergoes in its activity, its capacity, its mode of operation, are matter (matter) of constant observation, indeed of every man's experience. Its essence is the same, its fundamental nature is unalterable, it never loses the distinguishing peculiarities which separate it from matter." (p. 119.)

sumptuous. Objects are material, our senses are material; these communicate inwardly by material nerves with a material brain: this exceeds our apprehension; but does talking of an immaterial mind charm the difficulty? To affirm that the thinking principle must be immaterial assumes much more than that all the properties of matter are known to the advocates of immateriality. What do they know of matter? Essentially nothing; yet still they know more than enough to awe human assurance in putting bounds to its capacity. Life is a modification of matter more accessible than mind to the cognizance of mind. Yet what is life? Abernethy conjectured that it was something analogous to the electric fluid: it may be so, yet this is material. But those who admit objects to be material, and the senses material, and the sensorium material also, and yet assert that that which apprehends by the means of these materials must be immaterial itself, seem to me to originate and multiply difficulties when they propose to elude them; they evidently speak without facts, if not apparently in opposition to them; for how can corporeal agents act on incorporeals? It may be so; but to say it must be so, and that because they so dogmatize, they must be believed, equals any outrage ever perpetrated by priest or fanatic against both man and nature. Such assertions are far remote from the confines of philosophy. Would not doubting on the subject be more becoming than dogmatism? Yet Lord Brougham

is peremptory; he will admit neither pause nor compromise. Mind he insists cannot be material simply or by combination, and this he avers, not for the credit of mind, but for the credit of man, though mind is not peculiar to man, but shared with all animals except the lowest. The notion, advocated principally by Descartes, that all animals except man are mere machines, has been long exploded. The tenants of earth, air, and water of various kinds are fond parents; many associate and cooperate for a common purpose, exhibiting reasoning, great memory, providence, ingenuity in averting accidents and constancy in overcoming them. These faculties are more early developed in them than in man; and for speed, strength of body, and in the acuteness and power of all their senses, many far exceed the human race. But they fail in the hand and the tongue, and in the after means of memorialing their experience. Thus other animals cannot exceed "the wisdom of their ancestors;" generation follows generation without any great increase of knowledge to the succeeding. But man's experience, with few exceptions, survives his decease, and this proceeds accumulating, till those in succeeding ages may be said to have lived through all bygone time. I speak of civilized man, for savages profit little by their predecessors. They have small means of storing or transmitting their knowledge, and in this respect they are little superior to their fellow-foresters, who together fall back into the wilds and

woods, and perish together. If mind be immaterial* and therefore immortal, as is inferred, so the minds of all thinking animals are immortal; for though the minds of men vary from those of other animals in degree, they do not differ from them in kind. Leading characteristics are common to both, and why should not the result correspond? Hence it has happened that while some have attempted to escape the necessary conclusion, as Butler in his Analogy, &c., others, and those not the least strenuous for the immortality of the soul of man, have extended an after being to the souls of brutes, as Dr. Hartley, who says, "the future existence of brutes cannot be disproved, and that he expects and hopes they will be our brothers and sisters in the higher sense in immortality." The Rev. R. Dean also argued that they will be finally delivered at the general restoration of mankind. These opinions, however extravagant to many, follow of course. An atom is as much matter as a world of atoms, and a short process of thinking implies mind as much as an elaborate one. If mind be

* And why, on the same argument, should not plants enjoy a futurity? "Life I would therefore assume to be a principle in vegetation, distinct from its material substance, and additional to it." (Sharon Turner, p. 512.)

This accords with Empedocles, and Plato taught that plants have a soul.

Yet are all these outdone. "The Fiji's doctrine with abundant liberality extends it [immortality of the soul] to all mankind, to all brute animals, to all vegetables, and even to stones and mineral substances." (Mariner's Tonga Islands, vol. ii. p. 122.)

immaterial and immortal in one case, it is immaterial and immortal in the other, and the premises of such reasoners lead inevitably to this conclusion. Yet what is gained for or against the popular notion of the immortality of the soul, or mind, by supposing it material or immaterial? Whatever exists will exist, let the verbalist dogmatize till doomsday. Assuming the soul to be material, concurs with everything connected with it—object, sense, sensorium, brain, &c.; but asserting that it is immaterial only adds a delicate Ariel to Prospero and his divining rod, exposing a phantom in vacuo, which, instead of fixing the enchantment, dissipates the abstraction. Lord Brougham, however, dogmatizes on this point immeasurably; he says, "The evidence which we have of the existence of the mind is complete in itself, and wholly independent of the qualities or existence of matter;" adding, "It is not only as strong and conclusive as the evidence which makes us believe in the existence of matter*, but more strong and more conclusive." (p. 104.) And having pursued a series of gratuitous assertions, he tops the climax by affirming, "We have therefore evidence of the strictest kind, induction of facts the most precise and unerring, to justify the conclusion, that the mind exists and is different from and independent of matter alto-

* The following couplet would have suited this *voluntary*:

"For of the soul the body form doth take,
For soul is form and doth the body make."

gether." Why? Who ever had cognisance of minds without bodies? He says, "If the mind perishes or ceases to exist at death, it is the only example of annihilation." (p. 107.) Who talks of annihilation? He subjoins, "It may be said, why should it not, like the body, be changed, or dissipated, or resolved into its elements? The answer is plain, it differs from the body in this, that it has no parts, it is absolutely one and simple, therefore it is incapable of resolution or dissolution." (p.108.) Whence the proof of its being one and simple? The mind possesses various powers and faculties; these do not favour the oneness of the mind. But how monstrous to dogmatize that the *mind exists, and is independent of matter altogether*! Can there be mind where there are no subjects for the operation of sense; or could mind exist without the senses, which are material? Deduct a sense and so much is withdrawn from the capability of the mind; it is halt or extinct to the amount of the sense impaired or obliterated. When the sense had been enjoyed and lost, the mind suffers, and its impressions from recollection wear away, while on the senses being restored, the mind expands, but not suddenly. The blind boy Mitchel* used

* "To the sense of smell, he seemed chiefly indebted for his knowledge of different persons." (Monthly Review, Dec. 1813, p. 368.) And on smelling a person, he determined whether he wished to know a stranger or not. (p. 369.) After obtaining his sight, he depended little to the information given by his eye, and always turned away his head, while he carefully examined, by his sense of touch, the whole surfaces of the body presented to him." (Ibid. p. 370.)

the sense of smelling for seeing, and on being restored to sight, continued occasionally to employ his older sense in preference, or in conjunction with his new born vision. Lord Brougham, not satisfied with that topping unruly assertion that mind is wholly independent of matter, resorts to dreaming (his own dreams, it would appear,) for facts in support of his assertion. The immateriality of the soul (ever honoured be Queen Mab's witchery) proved by dreaming!! He continues, "A multitude of facts, chiefly drawn from and connected with the phenomena of dreams, throw a strong light upon the subject, and seem to demonstrate the possible disconnexion of mind and matter." (p. 111.) Such words, and in juxtaposition! *dreams—throw a light—seem to demonstrate—a possible disconnexion of mind and matter.* "Dreams throw a light" is a figure of speech which even the new theory, that light is not substantial but vibratory, will hardly authorize; and then to couple *seem* and *possible* with *demonstrate* is to associate the strongest and the weakest terms. Yet what does this dreaming prove, if it can prove anything? Just, as I have noticed, what the immateriality of human souls did in favour of the souls of brutes; for if dreaming proves possibly or probably the disconnexion of mind and matter in man, it proves the same in brutes, for dreaming is not a human prerogative: brutes dream, and who has not heard dogs bark, and noticed their ineffectual exertions in their sleep on the hearth-

rug? Pursuing the same dogmatic assertion that mind is independent of body, he says, "We are authorized from the facts, that unless some unusual and violent accident interferes, such as serious illness or fatal contusion, the ordinary course of life presents the mind and the body running courses widely different, and in great part of time in opposite directions, and thus affords strong proof both that the mind is independent of the body, and that its destruction, or the period of its entire vigour, is contrary to the analogy of nature." (p. 120.) What a medley of assumptions! The mind and body vary their powers with their age, and these powers vary also as they are exercised. Children excel in certain manual operations; many things are best performed by persons who approach, or who have just attained manhood, as those which require a combination of force and activity; but complete strength and endurance require increased years, and as a facility depends on habit, an advanced period of life may so improve corporal ability, as to give the older man a superiority over the younger and more vigorous. So in intellectual achievements, indeed habit is more operative in these than in bodily labours, and the hand is far more easily commanded than the mind; besides, length of years corrects erroneous opinions, while it extends experience and accumulates knowledge. In other points also an advance in years triumphs over mere manhood, which is often wayward and passionate. But it is gratuitous if not

absurd to say that the body is necessarily reduced* and debilitated *when the mind is in its entire vigour*, for vigour of mind and old age are not an ordinary (senectus ipse est morbus) but an extraordinary concurrence, and it is so indirectly admitted in common parlance, for when an aged person is mentioned as still preserving his faculties, the mere recital notes the singularity. Humanity fails with many years in quickness of apprehension, in memory, in mental exertion and energy.

Lord Brougham reserves his chief argument for the conclusion: this he avows, though he was sufficiently urgent in pressing each proof that he had hitherto advanced; he says, "The strongest of all the arguments, both for the separate existence of the mind and for its surviving the body, remains, and it is drawn from the strictest induction of facts. The body is certainly undergoing change in all its parts. Probably no person of the age of twenty has one single particle in any part of his body which he had at ten; and still less does any portion of the body he was born with continue to exist in or with him. All that he before had has now entered into new combinations, forming parts of other men or of animals, or vegetable or mineral substances, exactly as the body he now has will afterwards be resolved into new combinations after his death; yet the mind

* This exceeds the verse,

"The mind shall banquet though the body pine."

continues one and the same, 'without change or shadow of turning'; none of its parts can be resolved, for it is one and single, and it remains unchanged by the changes of the body." (p. 121.) I have spoken already of the dogmatism that the soul or mind is one or single, yet in the last quotation he far outdoes this and all his other bewildering positions, for it is obvious to sense, notorious, and universal that the soul or mind changes with the body, with too much or too little food, with much sleep or overwatching; all sorts of personal complaints, and a thousand circumstances, accidents, affections, relations, turn and turn again the human mind through all stages, from the lowest dotage to absolute and confirmed madness. Very small incidents will render man strange to his friends, and stranger to himself, almost to the loss of his personal identity. The soul or mind "without change or shadow of turning"! If so, every soul is like boasting Cæsar, "For I am constant as the northern star." It is clear Lord Brougham does not contemplate the resurrection of the body, for as he concludes that the body is renewed entirely at least every ten years, (perhaps much more frequently,) at seventy the self-same man has had seven new bodies; in other words, that this unchanging mind has had seven suits of renewed matter, which matter has been used and is in the occupation of other animals, &c., and which is perpetually adding shreds and patches to the corporal envelopes of other minds, human

and brutal. To suppose that the bodies of men thus interchanged and changing with inferior animals, and even with vegetable and mineral substances, should hereafter resume their bodily being is philosophically impossible, though under other views quite reconcilable to those of faith without stint; for Dr. Brown, the author of Vulgar Errors, says in his Religio Medici, (sect. 48,) "I believe that our estranged and divided ashes* shall unite again; that our separated dust, after so many pilgrimages and transformations into the parts of minerals, plants, animals, elements, shall at the voice of God return into their primitive shapes and join again to make up ther primary and predestinate forms."

Lord Brougham recurs with pleasure to his own statement that the mind continues the same while the body changes, changing entirely after the interval of a few years, and changed repeatedly during a long life, saying, "But observe how strong the inferences arising from these facts, both to prove that the existence of the mind is entirely independent of the existence of the body, and to show the probability of its surviving. If the mind continues the same while all, or nearly all, the body is changed, it follows that the existence of the mind depends not in the least degree upon the existence of the body, for it has already survived

* Eusebius speaks of certain persecutors who burned the bodies of the martyrs and threw their ashes into the Rhone to deprive them of the resurrection. (Præp. Evangel. lib. v. c. 10.)

a total change, or in the common sense of the words, an entire destruction of the body." (p. 122.) Adding another surprise to his startling doctrine, "In short, it is more correct to say that all of us who are now living have bodies formed of what were once the bodies of those who went before us, than it is to say that some of us who are now living at the age of fifty have bodies which in part belonged to others now living at that and at other ages. The phænomena are precisely the same, and the operations are performed in like manner, though with different degrees of expedition; but the facts referred to prove that after the body's death, that is, after the chemic dissolution which the body undergoes during life, the mind continues to exist as before. Here, then, we have that proof so much desiderated, the existence of the soul after the dissolution of the body with which it was connected." (pp. 123, 124.) What a Pindaric conclusion! Because he presumes the soul continues the same, and the body is changing and wearing and rejecting its atoms, and repairing this waste by assimilating imperceptible accessions of matter, the mind, which always existed in conjunction with body, shall exist after the dissolution of body, without body or any bodily adherence or connexion. And he superadds "that it appears to prove the possible immortality of the soul almost as rigorously as if one were to rise from the dead." (p. 124.) What ill assorted fugitive terms, *appear to prove the*

possible! and this is stated in the same sentence to be as rigorous as if one were to rise from the dead. But how could one rise from the dead? Certainly not bodily by his reasoning: not as a soul most certainly, for the souls do not die according to his hypothesis. It is strange that Lord Brougham, who is so confident in marking and separating body and mind, did not suggest how the mind becomes disengaged from the body. Burckhardt says that the people of Shennym believed that the soul escapes through the mouth, and are very anxious not to obstruct its passage; thence they consider strangling a dreadful punishment, and its commutation for impalement is purchased by the relations of the condemned." (Travels, p. 156.) Suppose, however, the body dead and the soul living, what becomes of this surviving partner? The soul has lost its fixity and station by the wreck and dissolution of the matter in which it was imprisoned. This inmate, hitherto living *au secret*, becomes separated from the body and dissociated from matter, what then becomes of it? Those Arabians escaped that difficulty who, according to Eusebius, taught that the souls died with the bodies, but revived at the resurrection. (Præp. Evang. lib. vi. c. 37.) Some sink souls under the earth. And Heraclitus said, agreeably to that location, that souls had a great power of smelling in Hades, αἱ ψυχαι οσμωνται καθ' ἁδην. (Plutarch, Moral. p. 615.) Others leave them to shift for themselves. But where are these immate-

rials to remain? Not on the earth--not in the air. The atmosphere which involves our globe is calculated to extend forty or fifty miles above its surface; something more attenuated pervades all space; even this is proved to be material by its operation on the motion of comets. If, then, all space be filled by matter, and the soul be immaterial, where can it rest? It must, like the poet's genius, ascend "bold and forth on leaving no track behind." When the soul was held to be something substantial, the advocates for this qualified immateriality considered that the soul returned whence it came, to æther, αιθερ σεμνοτατον βιοθρεμμον παντων, that is, while body sunk into the earth, his mind mingled with the soul of the world: Æthereum est quod a seipso movetur. (Cicero, tom. iv. p. 319.) Hence Themistius compared death to the initiation in the mysteries: he added, soul we say has perished when it has changed and returned into the order of the universe, which it could not while living in the body; thus to die resembles participation in the great mysteries, for which reason a similar word was employed on both occasions, τελευταν to die, τελεισθαι to be initiated. (Apud Stobæum, Sermo, c. xix. p. 604.) For an immaterial a vacuum is the fit residence, and negatives can only be at home in a void. A native on the African coast exemplified this immaterial arrangement. Captain Owen asked him how he could live hereafter: he answered, "Me stop here;" then pointing first to his shadow and

upwards, "Dat man go dere*." (Owen's Voyage, vol. i. p. 235.) I do not decide on the question, though I admit I have no notion how that which is not material can subsist in a material world, nor can I understand how matter† can operate except on matter.

* A good commentary on Pindar's brief expression, who called man the dream of a shadow, σκιας οναρ ανθρωπος. (Plutarch Moral. p. 63.)

† Dr. Reid said, "nothing can *act immediately* where it is not I think must be admitted, for I think with Sir Isaac Newton, that power without substance is inconceivable."

Printed by RICHARD TAYLOR, Red Lion Court, Fleet Street.

WORKS

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

---

1. Principles of Morality.

2. The Independent Man; or, An Essay on the Formation and Development of those Principles and Faculties of the Human Mind, which constitute Moral and Intellectual Excellence.

3. National Government.

4. National Education.

5. Defects of the English Laws and Tribunals.

6. On the Catholic Question.

7. State of Ireland.

8. No Veto.

9. State of Europe in January 1816.

10. An Inquiry concerning the Population of Nations: containing a Refutation of Mr. Malthus's Essay on Population.

11. Radical Reform Restoration of Usurped Rights.

12. The Poor and their Relief.

Photomount
Pamphlet
Binder
Gaylord Bros. Inc.
Makers
Stockton, Calif.
PAT. JAN. 21, 1908



DATE DUE

BRODART, CO. Cat. No. 23-221-003

GTU Library
2400 Ridge Road
Berkeley, CA 94709
For renewals call (510) 649-2500
All items are subject to recall.